By M K Bhadrakumar
Feb 26, 2008
ATimes
The high Qandil mountains and deep gorges on the northern Iraqi border region with Iran must be one of the world's most ideal terrains for guerrilla war. That is where the fighters of the separatist Turkish Kurdish movement the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) have set up its headquarters. The PKK is close enough to the Turkish border to stage its guerrilla attacks and can easily frustrate "hot pursuits" by the Turkish army.
There is a popular saying that Kurds have no friends but the mountains. The region offers one of the world's spectacular natural fortresses, virtually impossible to penetrate. Especially so in the winter with heavy snowfall, frequent treacherous avalanches and howling icy winds mercilessly ransacking anything out in the open.
Without doubt, the seasoned military commanders in Ankara know that the Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq, which began last Thursday just after sunset, can settle nothing. The Pashas are highly professional men and are hard realists who act with deliberation. They would know that it will not be easy to find the Kurdish guerrillas who know every inch of their mountain strongholds and evaded for decades even a skilful predator like Saddam Hussein.
More so, since the current Turkish operation lacks the all-important element of surprise. It has been in the making for months - visibly and meticulously. It has been on the drawing board at the military, political and diplomatic level. Besides, the world knows it is not in the Turkish character to back off, looking weak, when provoked. The first stage of the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq began last December when the Turkish air force started attacking PKK camps and insisted this was a prelude to a ground offensive to follow.
Turkey's General Staff said that 33 PKK rebels, including a leader, and eight soldiers died in heavy fighting in poor weather conditions on Sunday. It said at least 112 rebels and 15 soldiers had died since the operations began.
Turkish Domestic Reaction
The Kurdish guerrillas knew they had provoked Turkey too far this past year and retribution wouldn't be long in coming. They could have gone into hiding. Therefore, the Turkish incursion on Thursday is to be evaluated not for its military results but for its political and strategic implications. A few hundred Turkish troops on search-and-destroy missions in the Iraqi mountains cannot solve the Kurdish problem. They may render a blow to PKK morale, but when the snow melts and the passes open, it is a wide open question whether the PKK cadres will resume their bloody business.
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Shifting Alignments In Iraq
However, the timing of the incursion has a far wider significance. It is obvious that the timing has much to do with political alignments within Iraq. For the first time since 2003, Iraqi Kurds are politically isolated. The Kurdish parties have come under pressure from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government, as it pushes through a US$45 billion budget that substantially reduces the share of income of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) from 17% to 14.5%. Baghdad also refuses to pay the salary of the 80,000-strong Kurdish militia (Peshmerga) or to allow the provincial legislature to remove federally appointed provincial governors. Equally, Baghdad is firm on the federal government's prerogative to be the sole authority to award contracts to foreign oil companies.
Sunni parties, the Shi'ite Sadrist movement, the Turkomen party (supported by Ankara) and possibly the Iraqi List headed by former prime minister Iyad Allawi (who has links with the West) are arrayed as a majority grouping within the Iraqi Parliament, which seeks strengthening of Baghdad's central authority over the Kurdish provinces. The US remains supportive of Maliki.
Iraqi Kurdish ambitions no longer match US interests. A devastating recent essay by Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute titled "Is Iraqi Kurdistan a Good Ally?" analyzed the shifting alignments. Rubin thoroughly questioned the assumptions regarding the Iraqi Kurds' "pro-Americanism". He underscored that Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani would turn out to be like former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as a thorn in Washington's side. Rubin alleged double-dealings by the Iraqi Kurds with Iran. He suggested the rampantly corrupt and decadent leadership in Kurdistan could only lead to a strengthening of the forces of religious conservatism and the growth of Islamist parties.
Rubin concluded, "As Turkish warplanes bomb terrorist bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, it is time for both Washington and Irbil [capital of the KRG] to reassess their policies. Washington has many cards to play. Sympathy to Kurdistan is understandable, but is increasingly based on myth. US goodwill should never be an entitlement. Barzani may remain an ally, but he has disqualified himself from any substantive partnership. It is time to take a tough-love approach to Iraqi Kurdistan. There should be no aid and no diplomatic legitimacy so long as Iraqi Kurdistan remains a PKK safe haven, sells US security to the highest bidder, and leaves democratic reform stagnant."
Nothing like this has ever been said by a leading American analyst about the Iraqi Kurds, who were the darling of US policymakers through the past 17-year period since Saddam's catastrophic Gulf War in 1991. Rubin sent out a deadly message - Washington has no more critical need of Iraqi Kurds.
He was spot on. The US military in Iraq has concluded that the best means of countering the Sunni insurgency is by bribing the militants. The success of the policy has sharply reduced US dependence on the Kurdish Peshmerga. As the US military works on a similar deal with the Shi'ite Sadrist militias as well, the use of Peshmerga as foot soldiers of counterinsurgency operations further diminishes.
The US's Iraq Strategy
The shift in US thinking is already manifesting. The referendum on the status of the Kirkuk area, which was due last December, stands postponed until June - perhaps, indefinitely. Washington may listen to Ankara's plea that Kirkuk must be given a special status under a United Nations mandate, as the Turks do not want to see it incorporated into Iraqi Kurdistan.
Washington has abandoned any plans of setting up a permanent military base in northern Iraq. William Arkin, a prominent US security analyst, wrote in his Washington Post blog last week that President George W Bush is pressing ahead with a period of "consolidation and reorganization" and "the likelihood of any significant change in Iraq is slim".
Arkin substantiates that Bush is "quietly putting in place the pieces that will indeed tie the next president's hands". The emphasis is on contracting US combat forces in Iraq to a fewer number of combat forces and special operations forces and to fight the war in Iraq from other locations.
Thus, in Kuwait, the US is completing finishing touches on a permanent ground forces command for Iraq and the region, which is capable of being a platform for "full spectrum operations" in 27 countries around southwest Asia and the Middle East. In Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, the US Air Force and navy have set up additional permanent bases.
According to Arkin, "tens of billions have been ploughed into the American infrastructure", and "permanently deployed with the new regional headquarters in Kuwait will be a theater-level logistical command, a communications command, a military intelligence brigade, a 'civil affairs' group and a medical command".
But, interestingly, the Bush strategy virtually leaves Iraq's northern side without any significant American military presence. Such a security vacuum is unsustainable. Clearly, Washington expects Turkey to play a major role as the guardian of the stability of northern Iraq. This is logical thinking. Turkey is perfectly capable of keeping at bay the two other prowling powers in northern Iraq's neighborhood - Iran and Syria. It suits American - and Israeli - interests if Ankara doesn't advance its entente cordiale any further with Tehran and Damascus.
Ankara also welcomes the role of being a pivotal power in US regional policies. To quote Gungor Uras of the liberal Milliyet newspaper, "The US is now reshaping the Middle East. While this is happening, Turkey has the choice of either sitting on one side and watching developments, or taking an active role. US support has great importance for ending terrorism in Turkey, resolving the Kurdish and Armenian issues, our relations with our neighbors, and keeping the military strong ... Do not forget that the US carried us to the waiting room of the European Union ... Foreign capital and loans come through New York.
Washington's green light is important to prevent jams on the road to New York." Moreover, the transportation routes of the oil and gas resources of northern Iraq pass through Turkey. Ankara has a genuine interest in keeping the area stable. Several inter-linkages have already appeared around energy security. The growing regional energy interdependence places Turkey at an advantage. Turkey has always prided itself as Europe's energy hub. Washington will encourage a key role for Turkey in proposed trans-Caspian energy pipeline projects, which will also put the brakes on swiftly expanding Russia-Turkey cooperation. The Arab Gas Pipeline connects Turkey with Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt. Turkey is working on an energy linkup with Israel.
Again, it is the oil and gas supplies from Iraq that will help realize the viability of the 3,300-kilometer Nabucco pipeline (running from the Caspian Sea via Turkey and the Balkan states to Austria), without which Russia's tightening grip over the European energy market cannot be loosened, which, in turn, holds profound implications for Russia's relations with Europe and for the US's trans-Atlantic leadership.
US Policy Review On Turkey
Thus, all in all, Washington has estimated the urgent need to accommodate Turkey's aspirations as a regional power. The Bush administration seems to have undertaken a major policy review toward Turkey in the October-November period last year around the same time it considered the follow-up on the troop "surge" in Iraq. It concluded that for a variety of reasons, abandoning Iraqi Kurds to their fate is a small price to pay for reviving Turkey's friendship.
The turning point came during the visit of Erdogan to the US in November. Almost overnight, the body language of US-Turkey relations began to change. The chilly rhetoric abruptly changed to warm backslapping. The emphasis was on the commonality of interests in the struggle against terrorism. There was an unmistakable impatience in the US calls on the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to restrain the PKK through concrete steps.
Immediately after Erdogan's visit, deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Ergin Saygun, received his American counterpart, General James Cartwright, and the US's top commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, in Ankara for follow-up discussions. They established a mechanism for intelligence-sharing. And the US began supplying Turkey with real-time intelligence regarding PKK activities in northern Iraq.
By the time US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Ankara a week later in early December, she could already acknowledge that Turkey had a "comprehensive plan" to fight the PKK. The tacit understanding with the US enabled Turkey to launch the air strikes inside northern Iraq from December 16 onward. Washington - and European countries - openly accepted the legitimacy of Turkey's attacks on the PKK bases. It was a major diplomatic and military victory for Ankara.
Turkish columnist Cuneyt Ulsever wrote in Hurriyet, "My greatest pleasure in this operation is that Turkey was able to show the entire world that it is the greatest power in the Middle East. This should be a warning not only to the PKK, but to all nations about Turkey's superiority in terms of both technology and the human capital employing it."
The US-Turkish bonding rapidly thickened as it happens when old friends get together. At a speech at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars during his visit to the US in January, Turkish President Abdullah Gul said, "Turkey and United States are partners in Iraq. Needless to say, we both have [a] great stake in Iraq's security and stability and welfare."
Even the left-wing Kemalist Cumhuriyet newspaper acknowledged, "A new era is upon us [in US-Turkey relations]." With a sense of deja vu, Iraqi Kurd leaders began realizing that Bush has done a Kissingerian trick on them and the ground has shifted beneath their feet. Since November, they have been resigned to the inevitability of Turkish military operations inside northern Iraq. More important, they have assessed that with the u-turn in US policy, the odds are heavily stacked against them. The Kurds know from long experience it is futile to be defiant of a superpower, especially when it bonds with a strong regional power - at least for the time being.
Both Barzani and Kurdish leader and President Jalal Talabani have accepted that as long as the Turkish operations are in the nature of "limited military incursions to remote, isolated, uninhabited regions" of northern Iraq - to quote Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebary, who is also Barzani's nephew - they won't make a fuss about the Turkish violation of Iraqi sovereignty. When the Turkish jets and helicopter gunships first appeared over the northern Iraqi skies in mid-December, it was apparent that Barzani had abandoned the PKK and henceforth the latter would be on its own. Barzani expects Ankara to appreciate his attitude as a serious concession and an act of goodwill.
The three-way equation throws light on an obscure aspect of Ankara's ties with Barzani. Turkey and Barzani are equally interested to see that the transportation of oil from northern Iraq proceeds without disruption. In the future, as increased volumes of oil (and gas) begin to flow, this convergence of interests will only get reinforced.
Muted International Reaction
Ankara can derive satisfaction that there has been no outright condemnation of its military incursion by the international community. Turkish diplomats claim that the Iraqi authorities had "close knowledge" of the incursion in advance.
Zebary told the BBC that "all this has been done unilaterally", but he would only point out that the Turkish action had the "potential to escalate" and, therefore, should end "as soon as possible", and he couldn't "contemplate" any protracted stay by the Turkish army on Iraqi soil.
Indeed, Europe, which is grappling with the Kosovo issue, is hardly in a position to prescribe the cannons of international law to Turkey. Predictably, United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon sounded defensive. The Arab League essentially called for restraint by Turkey.
Ankara has little to worry about. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates sees no reason to postpone his scheduled visit to Turkey on Tuesday. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak visited Ankara on February 13. His main agenda was to canvass for Israel's highly lucrative arms sales to Turkey, but in his meeting with the Turkish chief of general staff, General Yasar Buyukanit, Barak said Israel supported Turkey's fight against the PKK. (This was despite Gul's criticism of Israeli attacks on Gaza when Barak called on him.)
General James Cartwright, deputy head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, also arrived in Ankara on February 13 for discussions with his Turkish counterpart, General Ergin Saygun, on the operations against the PKK. The two generals are the point persons designated by Washington and Ankara as responsible for coordinating US-Turkey military cooperation in countering the PKK.
Evidently, Turkey is acting in concert with the US and Israel. The US and Israel endorse Turkey's pre-eminent role in northern Iraq. With the Balkans in focus and with defeat staring in the face of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan, Turkey's importance as a key US ally is rising. Turkey commands the KFOR (Kosovo Force) in southern Kosovo. Turkey has historical influence in the Balkans.
The fact is, the Kosovo model is both good and bad for Turkey. As Russian President Vladimir Putin caustically suggested last week, the West should also now recognize Northern Cyprus as Turkish. On the other hand, Kosovo sets a bad example for separatist elements in Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iraq. Ankara's prompt decision to recognize the "independent" Kosovo was indeed a diplomatic signal to Washington that it is willing to harmonize its foreign policy decisions with US geostrategy.
Turkish Role In Afghanistan
However, for Washington, it is not Ottoman Turkey's legacy in the Balkans, which is all very well as misty history, but what Ankara can tangibly do for it in Afghanistan that becomes the number one priority. Frank Hyland, a former US intelligence official (who served in the Central Intelligence Agency's Counter-Terrorist Center, the National Security Agency and the National Counter-Terrorism Center) wrote recently that Washington has requested Turkey to step up its troop deployment in Afghanistan and, more importantly, to deploy the troops in active combat missions against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. (The 1,000-strong Turkish contingent is presently deployed in non-combat duties in and around Kabul.)
Turkish media criticized that the US was seeking a quid pro quo from Turkey for its cooperation in the fight against the PKK. This is a correct reading of Bush's intentions. During his two-day mission to Turkey on Tuesday, Gates will reiterate the US expectations. Hyland says, "Washington is well aware of the strong hand it brings to negotiations with Turkey, considering the latter's need to locate and track PKK guerrillas in support of Turkish military operations."
Certainly, when someone takes its help, Washington usually expects the friend to return the favor. Ankara can't be an exception. But, will the AKP reciprocate? It will be a tough call. The Islamist AKP government will seriously ponder over the irony of ordering troops to get cracking on militant Islamists as part of a NATO force, which a growing number of alienated Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan view as an occupation army. Turkey would consult its close friend, Pakistan.
But Bush is running out of time. He will expect Erdogan and Gul to stand up and be counted as true friends by the time NATO gathers for its summit in Romania in early April. Hyland sums up, "Given the stakes for the United States, the tough negotiations over the NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan have just begun with other NATO allies as well as with Turkey. After making a general appeal for additional troops across the entire NATO community, the United States appears to have chosen Turkey as the 'best-chance' ally to focus on for immediate results.
"Turkey's success against the PKK since real-time intelligence made it possible to hit targets in Iraq with pinpoint precision, is a considerable inducement in the ongoing discussions, especially as spring approaches - the traditional season for the commencement of another PKK campaign."
The buck of course stops with the Turkish Pashas. They are wise men, who are not given to hyperbole. They will coolly evaluate the challenge of fulfilling Bush's great expectations of Turkey as a regional power - not only in the snow-clad, windy Qandil mountains, but also in the inhospitable Hindu Kush notorious for its unwelcome ways.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.)
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